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BAR BRIEFS

sub-section 5, "that the said E. has been guilty of a wilful violation of
his duty as an attorney and counselor in engaging in offensive personalities and in advancing facts prejudicial to the honor or reputation of parties and witnesses and not required by the justice of the
cause with which he was charged; that the conduct of the said E.
cannot be excused upon the grounds of youth or inexperience, that
the matters complained of did not occur in the heat of trial but were
carefully thought out and planned after mature deliberation by said
E., and that said E. had proved himself unworthy as a member of the
Bar." HELD: "Were there any doubt in our minds as to the culpability of the respondent or as to his unfitness to remain a member
of the Bar, that doubt would be wholly dissipated by his attitude
throughout these proceedings, culminating in his final brief filed
in this Court. He has been wholly unrepentant and always defiant.
He has in his written statements, his brief and his arguments, reiterated again and again the offensive charges and statements. He has
intimated that lawyers are venal and the courts corrupt. In his final
brief he in effect challenges this Court to disbar him. . And he
concludes 'I will only say that while my head may be bloody it is
unbowed, and I have kept the faith.' Disbarment is approved."
Reinertson vs. Rust: Action to recover upon two judgments entered in another state was disputed on ground that no summons or
other process was served upon defendant. The evidence disclosed that
summons was served in one case, but not in the other, although the
sheriff's return showed service in both cases. HELD: An officer's
return showing service of summons may be contradicted by proof
showing that no service was in fact made. A judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in another state may be impeached by facts
disclosing failure of proof of service.
NORTH DAKOTA BAR MAKING ITS IMPRESSION
The February issue of the Journal of the American Judicature
Society comments as follows concerning the address of President
Kvello at our last annual meetings:
"Addressing the North Dakota State Bar at its latest meeting
President Kvello outlined an inspiring program now made possible
through the substantial integration of the profession in his state. The
will to get things done was expressed in these persuasive words:
"'If we agree on any of these suggested measures, that is
only the first part of our duty. Unless we can bring home to
the public the necessity for these reforms by giving it the facts
in each instance and demonstrating the advisability of the adoption of the change, we have labored in vain. This is one of our
most important responsibilities, next to getting together on a
program. Every means of publicity should be taken advantage
of, including a friendly press, collective advertising and having
members of our profession on the programs of public meetings
of all kinds. We should be militant missionaries for these reforms for which we stand. The public is fair. With the facts
before them and a united bar behind them they will do their
share in a matter that is also their concern.'

BAR BRIEFS

"This quotation might well serve as a text for a long sermon.
President Kvello is one of the bar leaders whose opinions and expressions indicate that the profession is entering upon a new era. Too
long lawyers have all but gloated over alleged unpopularity of their
profession. They have felt so strongly entrenched in the governmental and economic situation that they could afford to ignore criticism.
Perhaps it would be more true to say that they have not possessed
the organic unity that would permit of affirmative replies to criticism.
But as soon as some measure of unity and power is acquired the
sense of responsibility awakens. The disposition then is not to waive
aside popular disapproval, not to attempt to disprove it, but to face
it squarely and make plans for removing the causes for criticism and
distrust. In other words, constructive ideals and programs come to
the fore.
"There is surely no more wholesome attitude than that of having
a bar program and of seeking publicity for it. The dealer in honest
goods has no better ally than publicity. Experience has already shown
conclusively that the public is quick to appreciate a will on the part
of a strong bar to take its part in the great work of government. In
the field of administering justice the bar can take the lead and achieve
universal approval. It is virtually without competition in its own
field. The public will be prompt to recognize a constructive attitude
and will ungrudgingly enlarge the public powers of the profession of
law when they are consecrated to the welfare of the state."
ACTIONS IN TORT-ASSIGNABILITY-SUBROGATION
We have noted the rather interesting discussion of the subject of assignability of actions in tort by Student-editor Carroll E.
Day in the February issue of the Dakota Law Review, as related to
the case of Grabow vs. Bergeth, 229 N. W. 282 (N. D.)
The decision, the author points out, is clearly contra that of the
South Dakota case of Sherman vs. Harris, 153 N. W. 925. To some
it may seem that it is also contra Tandsetter vs. Oscarson, 217 N. W.
66o (N. D.).
The Tandsetter case, however, dealt with the right of subrogation
in case of liability of a third party for an injury sustained by a
workman in the course of his employment. Yet, it might be argued,
that, even without the statutory provision, it is not certain that the
Bureau would not be subrogated to claimant's rights after paying
for his injury (37Cyc, 394, B8o); and, if so, what difference would
there be between the Bureau's situation and that of one who had received an assignment of the right of action? Is the right to subrogation the same in both instances?
In one case, Grabow's right to be subrogated depended upon the
specific assignment, for which he must have given a valid consideration. In the other, the Bureau's right to subrogation depended upon
the operation of a rule of law, either statutory or common.
Whether one agrees with the reasoning which prevented Tandsetter from prosecuting his claim against Oscarson, is immaterial. The
point is, that in both cases (Grabow and Tandsetter) there was "a
thing in action, arising out of an obligation," which was transferred

